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Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception - Irfan Ajvazi 
What begins as an exploration of perception - one which interjects the body between consciousness and the world 
(and institutes it as both Subject and Object, simultaneously) - and (through much of part two) restructures the way 
one views their interaction with the world and their relation with the world - eventually attempts to encompass the 
complication of the perceptive Other (which mostly closes part two). Part three then goes on to incorporate the first 
two parts into a restatement of the cogito (\"The fundamental truth is certainly that \"I think,\" but only on condition 
of understanding by this that \"I belong to myself \" in being in the world.\"), and to reorient ourselves (and our 
perception) in a temporal flow (yes, M-P attempts to redefine time), and then eventually closing on a truly 
triumphant note.
If the synthesis could be actual, if my experience formed a closed system, if the thing and the world could be 
defined once and for all, if spatio-temporal horizons could (even ideally) be made explicit and if the world could be 
conceived from nowhere, then nothing would exist. I would survey the world from above, and far from all places 
and times suddenly becoming real, they would in fact cease to be real because I would not inhabit any of them and I 
would be nowhere engaged. If I am always and everywhere, then I am never and nowhere.Thus, there is no choice 
between the incompleteness of the world and its existence, between the engagement and the ubiquity of 
consciousness, or between transcendence and immanence, since each of these terms, when it is affirmed by itself 
makes its contradiction appear. What must be understood is that for the same reason I am present here and now, and 
present elsewhere and always, or absent from here and now and absent from every place and from every time. This 
ambiguity is not an imperfection of consciousness or of existence, it is their very definition.
1. Merleau-Ponty wanted phenomenology to take centre stage as the main focus whereas Heidegger turned more 
towards ontology with phenomenology as his method. This creates a difference between philosophical motives.
2. Merleau-Ponty bequeaths us our thoughts on embodiment, which does not come into Heidegger. This makes MP 
feel much more reflective about biological concerns without compromising his stand with regards to either scientific 
or objectivist methods. For MP, the phenomenal body is an experience from the inside that rises towards the world 
to create meaning. The body for MP is a natural subject and expresses the existence of being-in-the-world.
3. Pre-reflective states. Our being-in-the-world is not a dualistic relation between an objective body and 
disembodied consciousness; rather it is a pre-objective perspective. The intertwining between consciousness and 
nature. I, as body-mind, am both open toward the and am part of the world.
This work is - together with Nietzsche's \"Beyond Good and Evil\" and Heidegger's \"Being and Time\" - a perfect 
cure for anyone who has overdosed on abstract thinking. Its message has yet to be heard by a wider audience and is 
bound to gain new appreciation as the currently dominant mode of thinking begins to falter. A thorough background 
in philosophy might be required to understand much of what Merleau-Ponty writes, but, then again, if you have not 
already spent a substantial amount of time in the realm of rational thinking, then it is unlikely that you require the 
relief that this work can bring.
Merleau-Ponty's classic text is a mixture of old and new. 
It carries heavy traces of Husserl and Heidegger in it. And of course Sartre.
Historically, it follows in the footsteps of Descartes, Kant, Berkeley, Spinoza, Bergson... but subverting the 
tradition. (Then again, all the great philosophers have always subverted tradition.)
The notion of the primacy of the (intentional) body is utilized to overcome the subject-object dualism. There is no 
mystical union, here: the being-in-the-world as an intentional body is presented as a matter-of-fact 
phenomenological reality. Mostly it becomes a matter of SEEING ourselves without pretensions, NOT as possible 
objects of the natural sciences, NOR as a sublimely transcendental \"thinking thing\" in the Cartesian fantasy, nor as 
Good God's creatures, but as WORLDLY consciousnesses, with BODIES that reach out into the world, thus 
grounding reality itself. 
The whole analysis is elaborate and a bit all over the place, but the basic point is well-made. 
As is typical of the French tradition, the language turns occasionally very poetic and literary. Rhetorical flourish, 
and a good quip, is preferred over analytical intelligibility, and a simple syllogism. This is the difference between 
the German-French and the Anglo-Saxon traditions. The worst-reading parts are influenced by the tortuous language 
of Hegel, but as long as one is comfortable with its off-putting terminology - such as \"for itself\" and \"in itself\" - 
the methodology that Merleau-Ponty uses is, all things considered, relatively rational. There are no wild leaps of 
logic, just a few wild goose chases. Arguments are happily sprinkled full of real-life examples, literary quotations, 
and even references to empirical (Gestalt) psychology.
So, to sum up my criticism:
1) The text is sometimes too obscure - i.e. unclear - for its own good. (A fact perhaps made worse in translation.) It 
would have been a better book with tighter editing and a more focused structure. Such looseness, alas, is a common 
problem in French philosophy - but this doesn't excuse Merleau-Ponty's falling into the same trap. Some chapters 
are better than others. None are perfect.
2) Despite its major innovations, the arguments are often rehashed from the classics. It is not the most original of 
works, even if it revolutionized the way we approach, or interpret, phenomenology. Merleau-Ponty did not 
completely extricate himself from the Husserlian-Cartesian projects. He simply wanted to follow it faithfully to the 
existentialist direction. Furthermore, by rehashing traditional themes, and tossing them about, he often gets 
entangled in some old Cartesian snares.
Despite these problems - which are mostly quibbles - the book is well worth a read. It has been used in philosophy - 
e.g. in aesthetics, psychology, epistemology and ontology - to achieve great insights and new avenues of study. And 
it also forces a deep self-study on the (un)fortunate reader.
It is a remarkable work in many ways. But just how this book, full of the unique spirit of its times (Les Temps 
Modernes and all that jazz), written in a laid-back but obscurantist fashion, will be rated in a hundred years, is hard 
to judge. Perhaps it will be forgotten, or treated as an \"in-between\", second-rate work of those years, relegated in 
the shadow of Heidegger and Sartre?
Or perhaps someone, with less Hegelian baggage, will come along, one day, and express the same thing - the 
fundamental bodily-phenomenological insight - more clearly, for a new audience? (Or perhaps one would do better 
to read some Hubert Dreyfus instead.) That would be desirable, because unfortunately many people will find the 
form in which the argument is presented to be impenetrable. 
For eternalism renders the very concepts, past, present, and future, meaningless. Therefore, scientific intuitions are 
not founded on common-sense intuitions. Now, anyone who has read Phenomenology of Perception knows how 
devastating this demonstration is. For Merleau-Ponty relies, almost on every page, on just this assumption, in 
conjunction with the other assumption, that there is no unconscious consciousness. After all, Merleau-Ponty will, 
after reducing scientific claims to life-world experience, then try to show that the order of experience is not 
generated solely by the mind, but by the figure-ground structure of the objects of the life-world. However, he can 
only successfully do this by appealing to the fact that we are not conscious of creating this structure. He assumes, 
from this, that the structure in question emanates from the world itself (and from our bodies in relation to it). Hence 
he rules out the possibility that this structure emanates from unconscious mechanisms of the mind. He does this on 
the mere supposition that unconscious consciousness is oxymoronic. As Jerry Fodor points out, the entire field of 
cognitive science, since the 1950's, is founded on the assumption that there are unconscious processes of mind 
determining the structures of experience. Hence every result of this field is a living refutation of the claims in this 
book, which was written in 1945. For instance, at one point, Merleau-Ponty identifies thought with speech. He needs 
to do this because he needs to reduce, after reducing scientific claims to the life-world, internalism to externalism (or 
show their equivalency), because he needs to show, against Kant, how the structure of the world is not wholly mind-
created, and that it emanates from the world and the body's relation to it, or whatever. So, thought is internal. Speech 
is external. For Merleau-Ponty, they have to be equivalent. It has, however, been demonstrated by cognitive science 
that preverbal infants understand concepts (i.e., they have thought) before they understand speech. Therefore they 
are, minimally, not equivalent (it might still be the case that all thought nevertheless takes place in language - but 
speech? c'mon!). Hence the equivalence of the internal and the external is unfounded. Merleau-Ponty assumes they 
are equivalent, because we are only fully conscious of our thought in speech (even this claim is suspect without 
knowing any cog-sci facts). He rules out the possibility that there could be thought processes we are unconscious of 
(and furthermore he rules out the possibility that experiments could show this). But this is just wrong (as the case of 
preverbal infants shows). Hence the assumption is wrong. Anyone who has read this book will know how absolutely 
destructive my critique is: for these two assumptions are behind almost every sentence here. Again, Merleau-Ponty's 
whole procedure and aim here is, first, reducing empiricist claims (science) to life-world intellectualist claims (to the 
mind-object-world relation) and, then, in order to oppose Descartes and Kant, reducing these claims to the 
mysterious body-thing-world relation. But the first reduction is impossible, because science contradicts our 
experience (something actually Descartes knew); and the second reduction is impossible, because the possibility 
exists that any given structure that we are not conscious of having made may nevertheless have been made by 
unconscious processes in the mind. This book, therefore, is, with massive irony, metaphysical dogma through and 
through; and you know what Hume says to do about that!
Merleau-Ponty has taken Heidegger's existential phenomenology and given it body! Heidegger's theory of dasein 
and the various ontological features that constitute it are abstract is ill-defended, even if it is intuitively appealing. 
From my reading, Merleau-Ponty covered all of Heidegger's main ontological themes and adds even more (e.g. 
sexuality, freedom). Moreover, he was up-to-date with the psychological and neurobiological findings at his time, 
and even if he ultimately rejects that scientific methods could ever get at the ultimate truth of our human condition, 
he is nonetheless scientifically minded and respectful of making his theories naturalistic and plausible. I would like 
to add that his theories have panned out in natural science; there is a movement in cognitive science called 
\"embodied cognition\" that is primarily inspired by Merleau-Ponty's embodied existential phenomenology and has 
provided solid analytic and empirical grounding to it. Furthermore, Merleau-Ponty writes beautifully, with 
unexpected, effective metaphors and examples. Compared to Heidegger, he rarely uses obscure jargon and takes 
time to carefully elaborate on any terms he introduces. Overall, Heidegger broke much more new ground in 
philosophy compared to Merleau-Ponty, but I feel that Merleau-Ponty importantly refines and elaborates on 
Heidegger, as well as crucially makes Heidegger's philosophy naturalistic and scientifically plausible.
My favorite chapters are \"The Body in Its Sexual Being\", \"Space\", and \"Freedom\". Uniquely, Merleau-Ponty 
draws on cases studies in psychiatric and neurobiological pathology and uses these empirical facts about abnormal 
minds and perceptual realities as springboards for his theories. I found Merleau-Ponty, unlike many other theorists 
who attempt this method, deeply compassionate, respectful, and accurate to these individuals with such pathologies. 
With this method, Merleau-Ponty both makes his theories more scientifically plausible and immensely poignant or 
powerful to the reader. I found myself even at tears in his chapter on sexuality, no joke! In this chapter, he explained 
how behavioral and somatic symptoms are not mere indicators of foul mental states, but rather they are concrete, 
literal manifestations of unusual, detrimental ways of relating to the world. The mistake of taking them as mere 
symptoms is the result of sticking to an empirical framework, and the truth of their existential nature is revealed 
when we access the deeper existential realm, from which all theoretical frameworks are derived. 
In the chapter on space, Merleau-Ponty makes the striking point that the world, which we find ourselves in, is 
presented by our body in continuous dynamical coupling with environmental structures since our time of birth (in 
other chapters, such as the one on temporality, he focuses more on our body's coupling to cultural traditions and 
sociality). It is important to remember this book is, foremost, a response to the question \"how can the world appear 
for us?\", and this chapter directly answers it especially. From earliest infanthood, our body learns, on the demand of 
its needs and motivations, the patterns of activities that lets us fulfill these intentions. This process, at the same time, 
discovers new features of the world. All objects and features of the world are thoroughly intentional and relevant to 
our activities and ways of life. Every discovery and acitivty is made possible by previous \"schema\" (general 
potential ways of being in the world that are always indeterminate and open to change) and at the same time adds to 
this schema, or provides further detail or a new alteration into the schema. These processes demonstrate how our 
body is in constant, reciprocal co-determination (coupling) with the environment; the world shows up in terms of the 
schema held in the body, an the schema of the body is constituted and determined by the world. So, whenever we 
focus our attention on a part of the world, and it appears for us instantly, it is given by our body-world, as a 
dynamical system. My conscious awareness is always less than and distinct from this deeper level of the body-
world, although the two are fundamentally integrated and determine each other. 
Interestingly, although Merleau-Ponty doesn't explicitly mention this point, I see that his theory can be extended to 
our evolutionary history. When we are born into the world, our genetics bound to the billions of years of 
innumerable individual creatures who have lived in dynamical coupling with this environment. Our lives are not our 
own in two senses; one is our own body and world in perceptual interaction; another is our body and genetic 
predecessors in causal determination since the beginning of life itself. I find this deep, substantive 
interconnectedness a secular source of sublimity and belongingness - or \"spirituality\" in banal terms. 
In the chapter on freedom, Merleau-Ponty resolves the debate on free will and determinism. He reveals how this 
quibbling is the result of a blind commitment to a combination of empirical causality and logical thinking. Genuine 
freedom can be understood only from an existential perspective, the most fundamental of all. Freedom is found in 
existential commitment - any commitment to a way of life, such as even philosophers' commitments to rationalism 
or empiricism. The status of any object or event in this world as being an obstacle or an enabler depends strictly on 
our existential commitments. Only when we have taken on a way of life and are concerned about it, then certain 
events will come with the significance of hindering or helping us on this project. For example, jagged rocks on a 
mountain will be a hinderance only to a person with an existential commitment to mountain climbing. To anyone 
else, these rocks would have other meanings or no significance at all. So, what we take to be obstacles to our 
freedom are in fact direct manifestations of our a priori freedom to pursue existential commitments. 
\"What is phenomenology? It may seem strange that this question has still to be asked half a century after the first 
works of Husserl\" So says Merleau-Ponty in the opening pages of `Phenomenology of Perception,' perhaps the 
major work of phenomenology after `Being and Time.' Merleau-Ponty sought, rather brilliantly, to redirect attention 
to the human body as the locus of our being-in-the-world for phenomenological inquiry. Unfortunately, I am 
convinced that Merleau-Ponty's efforts to turn the results of his phenomenology into an ethics and a politics are less 
impressive and important than Heidegger's breathtakingly brilliant attempt to use phenomenology as a means to 
fundamental ontology. Still, one has to admire Merleau-Ponty's command over biology and the natural sciences. His 
descriptions of visual illusions and phantom limbs are by now established classics of the field. However, many of 
his examples are needlessly extensive and dense. Less committed readers should turn to the final chapters of the 
book, where the majority of his philosophy can be found. 
Along with Heidegger, Sartre, Beauvoir, and Levinas, Merleau-Ponty is an \"existential phenomenologist\": a 
philosopher concerned with the experiences that constitute human existence. He's often overlooked in favor of 
Heidegger or Sartre, but this is unfair; his analysis of human embodiment not only build on theirs, but go much, 
much further.
Phenomenology of Perception is concerned with the first-person experience of being embodied, or of having a body. 
Merleau-Ponty shows how basic features of human experience, such as the perception of objects as independent of 
us, space and time, and rationality are all inseparable from the structure of the human body. 
In this work, Merleau-Ponty establishes a theory of truth by examining the centrality of the body to perceptual 
experience. Making use of phenomenological devices such as the eidetic reduction and intentionality, Merleau-
Ponty provides a critique of the traditional paradigms of rationalism and empiricism and posits an epistemological 
theory where the lived-world is an ambiguous and inexhaustible rich setting of contextualized phenomena. In short, 
this is an exploration of the fundamental structures of experience, including a compelling new concept of 
embodiment and a distinct paradigm separate from the epistemological traditions of rationalism and empiricism.
In this classic work of phenomenology, Merleau-Ponty tries to ground a third position between Kantian/Husserlian 
‘intellectualism’ (meaning that the mind constitutes the world) and empiricism, wherein the mind passively receives 
experiences from an independent world. Merleau-Ponty is the philosopher of perception and phenomenologist of the 
body par excellence. That being said, I think his project is for the most part inaccessible without a firm grasp of 
Husserl and Heidegger. I was able to see that he is adjusting and amending the Husserlian project as a newly 
disguised Heideggerianism. While understandably fashionable at the time to want to disavow Heidegger, I see this 
as a tremendous waste of time. 
The title is Phenomenology of Perception, so even if you don't know what \"phenomenology\" is (like I didn't when 
I first picked up this book), the focus appears to be at least half-clear: we're going to talk about perception (seeing, 
hearing, feeling, etc.). Merleau-Ponty argues that, to do a phenomenology of perception, we need to describe 
primordial perception: we need to describe the \"things in themselves\".
He begins with two theories: empiricism and intellectualism. Empiricism has an atomistic view of sensations. Thus, 
he argues it cannot account for the fact that perception comes to us as containing structure, as wholes (instead of 
points). Conversely, intellectualism privileges the constituting subject. Thus, he argues that it fails to account for the 
horizonal or ambiguous nature of perception. And then, throughout the book, he wrestles with these two approaches, 
always with reference to different dimensions of existence and perception. Ultimately, his argument demonstrates 
that these methods are incapable of accounting for primordial perception, lived experience, being-in-the-world. 
Take for example that, for Merleau-Ponty, the body is not the objective body, as extended in objective space, but the 
lived body. This body is the background against which objects appear; not a literal background in the visual field, 
but behind the gaze, or precisely what is not seen in order for us to be towards something else, towards what is seen: 
the object. Thus, the body cannot be seen in the mirror because it is the perspective from where one is looking; the 
body is what makes you a perspective on the world. 
Through the Schneider case, he shows how this can be understood through the relationship between primordial 
perception and the overlay of the virtual. The objective world or acquired cultural worlds are virtual. They populate 
your perception with potentialities and possibilities. For Merleau-Ponty, the objective body is just one of these 
possibilities. Thus, it is valid and can serve useful purposes (for biology, psychology, medicine, etc.). However, it is 
not the body of perception.
Later on in the book, he extends this line of argumentation to consider the world. This entails reconsidering sensing, 
space, and the natural world, among other things. This is where he truly introduces his notion of style. His 
arguments on orientation demonstrate nicely that our sense of up and down cannot be derived from the contents of 
our sensations, because that would completely relativize our sense of up and down. (e.g., Earth's gravity does not 
give you a sense of down, it simply directs your body towards the Earth. There is nothing down about it. We should 
say that gravity meets up with the sense of down-ness that pre-exists in the perceptual field.) Another crucial 
moment is his rumination on depth, and to briefly recapitulate: depth is fundamental to understanding the relation 
between the subject and the object, and its sense cannot be reconstituted by understanding depth to be breadth (in 
profile) in objective space, or the variation of apparent size of simultaneous sensory images.
Finally, arriving at being-for-itself and being-in-the-world. These are the three parts: (1) The Body, (2) The World, 
and (3) Being-for-Itself and Being-in-the-World. To focus on just the second section: Merleau-Ponty gives an 
account of temporality in order to conclude that Subjectivity is time, Time is subjectivity. Why?
Past and future exist all too well in the world, they exist in the present, and what being itself lacks in order to be 
temporal is the non-being of the elsewhere, of the bygone, and of tomorrow. The objective world is too full for there 
to be time. [...] The past, then, is not past, nor is the future future. It only exists when a subjectivity comes to shatter 
the plenitude of being in itself, to sketch out a perspective there, and to introduce non-being into it. (434, 444) 
The horizonality of experience, the ambiguity of perception, living in the world and freedom. There is so much 
about this book that I did not mention: love, sex, intersubjectivity, and so on. For me, this book showed me the 
promise of the phenomenological project. One way to temporarily set aside the philosophy of the linguistic turn. The 
description of experience, its primacy, existentialism; it's all a wonderfully compelling account of perception.
Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception represents a new direction in the movement of 
transcendental phenomenology inaugurated by Edmund Husserl’s Cartesian Meditiations and Martin Heidegger’s 
existential phenomenology in Being and Time. 
The motto of phenomenology is \"to the things themselves,\" a call for a return to (human) experience in and of 
itself. Everything that we know about the world and existence, we know in and though our sense perception - what 
Merleau-Ponty called the \"primacy of perception.\" Given this, Merleau-Ponty set out to offer an analysis of the 
phenomenological structure of perception. That is, he set out to answer the question of what we can know through 
our faculties of sense perception. 
In order to achieve this, Merleau-Ponty offers a critique of the body/mind dualism, an assumption present in 
philosophy since at least Plato and articulated in modern philosophy by René Descartes (see his Meditations on First 
Philosophy). Bridging the dualism between body and mind through a dialectical model of consciousness is arguably 
one of Merleau-Ponty greatest contributions to epistemology and phenomenology.
On freedom: 
(...) it cannot be held that there is such a thing as free action, freedom being anterior to all actions. In any case it 
will not be possible to declare: ‘Here freedom makes its appearance’, since free action, in order to be discernible, 
has to stand out against a background of life from which it is entirely, or almost entirely, absent. We may say in this 
case that it is everywhere, but equally nowhere.
On body and existence: 
body, caught up in existence; 
existence, perpetual incarnation
The body is our general medium for having a world.
On time and temporality: 
time does not flow like a river, 
it is the river.
There is a temporal style of the world, and time remains the same because the past is a former future and a recent 
present, the present an impending past and a recent future, the future a present and even a past to come; because, 
that is, each dimension of time is treated or aimed at as something other than itself and because, finally, there is at 
the core of time a gaze.
Maurice Merleau-Ponty's \"Phenomenology of Perception\" attempts - as Hubert Dreyfus says - to reclaim the role 
of the body in intelligent behavior; that is to say, your body is an essential component in cognition. A new 
translation by Donald Landes has just been released and this might help put a finer grain to Merleau-Ponty's ideas 
since the translator himself specializes in Merleau-Ponty's philosophy!
